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Still in Search of the  
Pro-Business Court 
Jonathan H. Adler† 
It was not long after Chief Justice John Roberts and Associate 
Justice Samuel Alito joined the Supreme Court before journalists and 
legal commentators declared that the Roberts Court had a soft spot for 
business. “Business Reigns Supreme,” the Washington Post’s editorial 
page declared at the close of the first full term after both justices were 
confirmed.1 “Much of corporate America was crowing last week after 
the Supreme Court ended a term notable for a string of rulings that 
generally favored businesses over consumers, employees, plaintiffs and 
investors,” the Post explained.2 Other commentators made similar 
observations.3 
 
†  Jonathan H. Adler is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and 
Director of the Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law. This Article was prepared in conjunction 
with the symposium on Business in the Roberts Court, at the Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law, September 23, 2016. Portions of this Article 
draw upon Jonathan H. Adler, Introduction: In Search of the Probusiness 
Court, in Business and the Roberts Court 1 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 
2016). 




3. See, e.g., E. Lee Reichert & Raymond L. Gifford, Business-Friendly Supreme 
Court—Commerce Enjoyed Positive Outcomes Under Chief Justice Roberts, 
Rocky Mountain News, July 14, 2007, § Wall St. West, at 2 (“Predictions 
that the additions of Justices John Roberts and Samuel Alito would create 
a more business-friendly Supreme Court have been validated this term . . . 
the net outcomes of this term’s cases are positive for business and commercial 
activity.”); Tony Mauro, High Court Reveals a Mind for Business, Nat’l 
L.J.: Legal Times (July 2, 2007), http://www.nationallawjournal 
.com/id=900005484768/High-Court-Reveals-a-Mind-for-Business?slreturn= 
20170228153702 [https://perma.cc/64HH-RT4E] (same); Christopher S. 
Rugaber, This Term, Supreme Court Has Been All Business—Conservatives 
and Liberals Find Common Ground on Cases Dealing with Financial 
Matters, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, July 1, 2007, at B5 (same); Nick 
Timiraos, Roberts Court Unites on Business, Wall St. J., June 30, 2007 
(same); Robert Barnes & Carrie Johnson, Pro-Business Decision Hews to 
Pattern of Roberts Court, Wash. Post (June 22, 2007), http://www. 
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The fullest explication of the pro-business Court hypothesis was 
presented by Jeffery Rosen in a lengthy article for The New York Times 
Magazine, “Supreme Court, Inc.”4 “[E]ver since John Roberts was 
appointed chief justice in 2005, the court has seemed only more recep-
tive to business concerns,” Rosen argued.5 Among other things, the 
Court had begun to accept more business-related cases as a percentage 
of its docket,6 a trend only made more conspicuous by the Court’s ever-
shrinking docket.7 Moreover, the Court seemed “surprisingly united in 
cases affecting business interests.”8 
Initial claims of a pro-business Court were largely based upon the 
Court’s pattern of decisions and the notable success rate of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce, which has become an increasingly active ami-
cus. In the 2006–07 term, for example, the Chamber of Commerce’s 
preferred side prevailed in thirteen of the fifteen cases in which it 
submitted a brief.9 While the Chamber has not sustained this level of 
success before the Court in subsequent terms, it nonetheless has an 
enviable success rate.10 
 
washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/06/21/AR2007062100803 
.html [https://perma.cc/EFE8-VT9X] (same). 




6. See id. (noting that the Court granted twenty-six percent of the Chamber 
of Commerce’s petitions between 2004 and 2007). 
7. See id. (noting that, as of 2008, the Court was accepting less than two per-
cent of the 10,000 petitions received each year); see also, e.g., Robert Barnes, 
Justices Continue Trend of Hearing Fewer Cases, Wash. Post (Jan. 7, 
2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/ 
06/AR2007010601094.html [https://perma.cc/8EVV-8CAB] (noting that the 
trend of taking fewer cases extends back to the beginning of the Rehnquist 
Court); David M. O’Brien, The Rehnquist Court’s Shrinking Plenary Docket, 
81 Judicature 58, 58 (1997) (“In the 1995 and 1996 terms, the Court . . . 
decided just 90 cases by written opinions each term, half the number of a 
decade ago.”). 
8. Rosen, supra note 4. 
9. Id. 
10. For a discussion of the Chamber of Commerce’s success rate before the Court 
during Chief Justice Roberts’s tenure, see Bradley W. Joondeph, Business, 
the Roberts Court, and the Solicitor General: A Further Exploration, in 
Business and the Roberts Court 13 (Jonathan H. Adler ed., 2016). As 
Joondeph notes, the Chamber prevails in approximately two-thirds of the 
cases in which it files a brief, a win rate comparable to that of the Solicitor 
General. When the Chamber and Solicitor General are aligned, however, the 
Chamber’s win rate has exceeded eighty percent. Id. at 28–29. 
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The Chamber’s court record is suggestive, but does it demonstrate 
that the Roberts Court has a soft spot for business? Perhaps, but per-
haps not. The Chamber regularly files amicus briefs in cases of major 
importance to the business community, but it does not file in every 
such case. The Chamber’s decision to file may be based upon a case’s 
importance, but it might also be based upon the likelihood of victory. 
The higher the Chamber’s success rate, the more valuable the Cham-
ber’s efforts may appear to its members. Notably the Chamber stayed 
its hand in some significant cases—cases in which the side favored by 
most business interests lost. Examples of such cases would include 
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,11 a Fair Labor 
Standards Act case in which the Court sided against the employer, and 
United Haulers Association v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste 
Management Authority,12 in which the Court rejected a Dormant 
Commerce Clause challenge to a local solid waste flow control plan 
opposed byother business groups.13 
Focusing on a single interest group in order to determine whether 
the Court—or a given case outcome—is pro-business can also be 
problematic because business interests often lie on both sides of a case. 
Most antitrust cases, for example, pit one corporation against another, 
as do many other business law cases. Even cases in which one might 
think the business interest is abundantly clear may pit different busi-
ness groups against each other. The lead plaintiff in the constitutional 
challenge to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act was the 
National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB).14 Yet it is well 
accepted that many business groups, including hospitals and insurance 
companies, benefitted from the statutory provisions NFIB sought to 
challenge. The Chamber of Commerce and numerous industry groups 
opposed claims that the Clean Air Act authorized regulation of green-
house gas emissions in Massachusetts v. EPA, yet businesses that stood 
to benefit from such regulation took the other side.15 
 
11. 561 U.S. 1 (2011). 
12. 550 U.S. 330 (2007). 
13. Id. Among the business groups filing briefs challenging the constitutionality 
of the ordinance in question were the American Trucking Associations and 
the National Association of Manufacturers. 
14. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (challenging 
the constitutionality of the individual mandate provision of the Affordable 
Care Act). 
15. Among those businesses and trade associations supporting the regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions were the Aspen Skiing Corporation, Calpine, and 
Entergy. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504, 510 n.15 (2007) 
(listing the organizations that filed amicus briefs in support of the regulations 
at issue). For a broader discussion on business support for climate-related 
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Accepting that the pro-business label may be problematic in some 
cases, it is often possible to identify which side in a given legal dispute 
is aligned with the prevailing interests of the business community. So, 
for example, whether the Court’s decision will generally inure to the 
benefit of employers over employees, manufacturers over consumers, 
regulated industries over government agencies, and the like, may serve 
as useful proxies for whether a given outcome may be fairly charact-
erized as “pro-business.” 
Quantitative studies have been generally supportive of the claim 
that the Roberts Court is at least somewhat more supportive of business 
than prior courts.16 The most comprehensive such study, by Lee 
Epstein, William Landes, and Judge Richard Posner, purported to show 
that the Roberts Court has been far more sympathetic to business con-
cerns than has any Court of the past sixty to seventy years.17 This 
conclusion was based upon looking at the rate at which businesses 
prevailed in cases against individuals, interest groups, and govern-
ments.18 Using this methodology, the authors found that businesses 
 
regulations, see Bruce Yandle & Stuart Buck, Bootleggers, Baptists, and the 
Global Warming Battle, 26 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 177 (2002). 
16. See, e.g., The U.S. Chamber of Commerce Continues Its Winning Ways, 
Constitutional Accountability Ctr. (June 30, 2014), http:// 
theusconstitution.org/text-history/2753/us-chamber-commerce-continues-
its-winning-ways (last visited Mar. 28, 2017) [https://perma.cc/MF9K-
RKQN] (“[S]ince Samuel Alito succeeded Sandra Day O’Connor on the 
Court in January 2006, the Chamber has won 70% of its cases [] compared 
with only 43% in the late Burger Court [] and 56% in the stable Rehnquist 
Court.”); J. Mitchell Pickerill, Is the Roberts Court Business Friendly? Is the 
Pope Catholic?, in Business and the Roberts Court, supra note 10, at 
35, 62 (“At an aggregate level, the empirical analysis in this chapter in-
dicates that the Roberts Court can be accurately characterized as business 
friendly.”). 
17. See Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business 
Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1472 (2013) (finding 
that the Roberts Court “is taking more cases in which the business litigant 
lost in the lower court and reversing more of these” and also “affirming more 
cases in which business is the respondent than its predecessor Courts did”). 
A follow-up to this study, including more recent data, reports similar 
findings. See Nick Wells & Mark Fahey, The US Supreme Court Is More 
Friendly to Businesses Than Any Time Since World War II, CNBC (Mar. 
1, 2017), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/01/supreme-court-very-business-
friendly-data-show.html [https://perma.cc/AX33-TFZG] (finding that the 
current Roberts Court “has decided in favor of business litigants over 60 
percent of the time”). 
18. For a critique of the authors’ methodology, see Jonathan H. Adler, Business 
and the Roberts Court Revisited (Again), Volokh Conspiracy (May 6, 
2013, 11:20 PM), http://volokh.com/2013/05/06/business-and-the-roberts-
court-revisited-again/ [https://perma.cc/2SFU-R6SF]. See also Epstein et 
al., supra note 17, at 1433 (describing the authors’ methodology). 
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prevail more often in the Roberts Court than in any of its post-war 
predecessors.19 
Quantitative studies, such as that conducted by Epstein, Landes, 
and Posner, have their value, but they also have their limitations. One 
particular concern is that quantitative assessments fail to account for 
the substance of the decisions, and do not differentiate between ordi-
nary cases and those with major ramifications. Nor do such analyses 
typically account for whether a given case marks a departure from prior 
precedent or paves new ground, nor do they consider the broader con-
text in which a case occurs. 
Failure to account for the content of the decisions and doctrinal 
baseline means that a quantitative analysis may find a “pro-business” 
trend when analyzing decisions that, when taken together, actually shift 
the law in a less business-friendly position. The Roberts Court’s three 
climate change cases provide a simple example of this result. In 
Massachusetts v. EPA,20 the Court decided 5–4 that states could sue 
the federal government for failing to take action to curb global warm-
ing, and that the Clean Air Act authorized the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency to regulate greenhouse gases as “air pollutants” under 
the Clean Air Act.21 In American Electric Power v. Connecticut,22 the 
Court decided 8–0 that (due to the Massachusetts decision) the Clean 
Air Act displaced nuisance actions against greenhouse gas emitters 
under the federal common law of interstate nuisance.23 Finally, in Utility 
Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,24 the Court largely affirmed the EPA’s 
authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from large emitters, sub-
ject to some limitations, splitting 7–2 and 5–4 on different issues.25 
From a business perspective, the three climate cases are best scored 
as a win (American Electric), a loss (Massachusetts), and tie (UARG), 
with the “pro-business” positions attracting a slight majority of the 
available votes in these cases. Thus, as a quantitative matter, it appears 
that business has fought climate regulation to a draw in the Supreme 
Court. The reality on the ground, however, is quite different. 
Massachusetts is potentially the most consequential business-re-
lated case of the past two decades. For starters, the decision made it 
easier for states and interest groups to sue the federal government for 
 
19. Epstein et al., supra note 17, at 1471–72. 
20. 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
21. Id. at 526, 532. 
22. 564 U.S. 410 (2011).  
23. Id. at 424. 
24. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014). 
25. Id. at syllabus.  
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failing to regulate business activity.26 More significantly, in holding that 
greenhouse gases are “air pollutants” subject to regulation under the 
Clean Air Act, the Court triggered the most dramatic expansion of 
federal environmental regulation in well over a decade.27 Although the 
precise question before the Court was whether the EPA could regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles,28 the logic of the decision 
effectively authorized regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from sta-
tionary sources as well, including those at issue in UARG.29 
By comparison, the American Electric Power and UARG opinions 
were relatively small potatoes. In American Electric Power, the Court 
did no more than reaffirm long-standing precedent that when Congress 
enacts a statute regulating cross-boundary pollution, such enactments 
displace suits alleging interstate nuisances under federal common law. 
As a consequence, there was little doubt that, insofar as the Clean Air 
Act authorizes the regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, it displaces 
federal common law nuisance suits against greenhouse gas emitters.30 
This decision was dependent upon the authorization of regulation in 
Massachusetts, and did nothing to undermine it. 
 
26. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 526 (2007). For more on the Court’s 
standing holding, see Jonathan H. Adler, Standing Still in the Roberts Court, 
59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1061, 1071–78 (2009). 
27. Id. at 532. For a discussion of the expansion of regulation triggered by the 
Massachusetts decision, see Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: 
The Proliferation of Greenhouse Gas Regulation Under the Obama 
Administration, 34 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 421 (2011). 
28. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528. 
29. Some have sought to dismiss Massachusetts v. EPA’s significance. Mark 
Tushnet, for example, argues that the case “was no more than a loss in a 
minor skirmish far away from the larger battlefield,” see Mark Tushnet, 
In the Balance: Law and Politics on the Roberts Court 204 (2013), 
and that “no one really expects the standards to take effect—ever.” Id. at 
203; see also id. at 213 (“Carmakers are unlikely ever to have to do anything 
to comply with the EPA’s proposed tailpipe emission standards.”). As it 
happens, the relevant motor vehicle regulations were already in place when 
Tushnet’s book was published. The vehicle emission standards at issue begin 
with the 2012 Model Year. See Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Standards and Corporate Average Fuel Economy Standards; Final Rule, 75 
Fed. Reg. 25324 (May 7, 2010) (issuing a final rule on new emissions 
standards for light-duty vehicles model years 2012 through 2016). Other 
regulatory measures were already promulgated, or well on their way as well. 
See generally Adler, supra note 27 (summarizing the regulatory initiatives 
authorized or otherwise made possible by Massachusetts v. EPA). Tushnet’s 
analysis also does not account for the standing holding in Massachusetts, and 
its potential effect on citizen suits. 
30. Am. Elec. Power v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 424 (2011). 
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UARG was more significant than American Electric Power, but it 
likewise reaffirmed the Massachusetts holding. Stripped of the particu-
lars, UARG merely trimmed EPA’s greenhouse gas regulation around 
the edges, limiting only its most expansive applications. UARG pre-
vented the EPA from asserting regulatory authority over smaller sta-
tionary source greenhouse gas emitters, but left the vast bulk of the 
EPA’s greenhouse gas regulations in place.31 
The net result of these three decisions is a dramatic expansion of 
federal environmental regulation over motor vehicles, utilities, and in-
dustrial sources.32 Whether or not one believes such regulations are jus-
tified, their costs are dramatic. By any measure, the resulting regulatory 
environment is vastly less business-friendly than before the cases were 
decided.33 Yet under a quantitative assessment, nothing meaningful has 
changed. In this way, a quantitative assessment of the effect of the 
Court’s climate decisions on business grossly misrepresents what has 
actually occurred. 
Business and the Roberts Court was an effort to get beyond pure 
quantitative analysis and unpack the ways in which the Roberts Court 
is—and is not—pro-business. Among other things, the book highlighted 
how exogenous factors, including the increased specialization of the 
Supreme Court bar and broader political trends, have influenced the 
Supreme Court’s approach to business issues. The collected essays also 
unpacked the Court’s handling of specific types of cases in an effort to 
understand why it has ruled the way it does.34 
Once one looks closely at the cases there is little evidence that the 
Roberts Court cares much about business interests, as such. Were this 
 
31. United Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2442–44 (2014). 
32. For a more detailed discussion of these decisions, see Jonathan H. Adler, 
Business as Usual? The Roberts Court and Environmental Law, in Business 
and the Roberts Court, supra note 10, at 297–304. 
33. At the time of this writing, the fate of the Clean Power Plan, another green-
house gas regulatory initiative made possible by the Massachusetts decision, is 
unknown. A challenge to the regulations is pending before the en banc U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit and there are reports that the Trump 
Administration may try to unwind the program through a new rulemaking. 
Linda Tsang & Alexandra M. Wyatt, Clean Power Plan: Legal Background 
and Pending Litigation in West Virginia v. EPA, Cong. Res. Serv. 1–4 
(Mar. 8, 2017) (summarizing the procedural history of the pending case); see 
also EDF Urges D.C. Circuit to Continue Judicial Review of the Clean 
Power Plan, Envtl. Def. Fund (Apr. 5, 2017), https://www.edf.org/ 
media/edf-urges-dc-circuit-continue-judicial-review-clean-power-plan [https: 
//perma.cc/8RN2-ZXWZ] (discussing the Trump Administration’s motion 
to indefinitely suspend challenges to the Clean Power Plan). 
34. See generally Business and the Roberts Court, supra note 10 (compiling 
a qualitative analysis of the ways in which the Roberts Court is and is not 
pro-business). 
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the case, one would expect business to win all the “big” cases—at least 
all the big cases that are close calls—and to only lose the relatively 
small or insignificant ones, or those in which the merits are clear. Here 
Massachusetts v. EPA is again Exhibit A, but it is hardly an isolated 
example. 
There is also little evidence that the Court is seeking to create and 
entrench a more pro-business legal environment. Most of the cases in 
which business interests prevail involve questions of statutory interpre-
tation or process. Relatively few involve constitutional questions.35 So, 
for example, when business groups sought to rein in punitive damages 
in Exxon Shipping v. Baker,36 the Court went along but on the 
narrowest of grounds, imposing a limit on the ratio of compensatory to 
punitive damages only for purposes of the federal maritime common 
law.37 Although prior Court decisions had found that excessive punitive 
damages violated the Due Process Clause, the Court did not rule for 
Exxon on this basis—a point emphasized by two justices in the ma-
jority.38 While sometimes amenable to finding federal preemption, the 
Roberts Court also appears to have backed away from the aggressive 
use of the Dormant Commerce Clause to invalidate state-level regu-
lations opposed by business groups.39 
In resting the vast majority of its business law decisions on sta-
tutory grounds, the Roberts Court appears to be taking its cues from 
Congress. Insofar as Congress enacts statutes that are amenable to 
business interests, the Roberts Court will not stand in the way. Yet 
insofar as Congress enacts laws with a more populist streak, or that 
otherwise constrain business activity, the Roberts Court will enforce 
these provisions as well. 
 
35. A conspicuous counter-example is Citizens United v. Federal Election 
Commission. This case, however, is best understood as part of the Court’s 
broader First Amendment jurisprudence, and not as a business case. See Joel 
M. Gora, In the Business of Free Speech: The Roberts Court and Citizens 
United, in Business and the Roberts Court, supra note 10, at 227, 228 
(“Not only was Citizens United well grounded in the Court’s First 
Amendment doctrine, but also it was a landmark for free speech and political 
freedom in our democracy.”). 
36.  554 U.S. 471 (2008). 
37. Id. at 481, 514. 
38. See id. at 514 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, 
including the portions that refer to constitutional limits that prior opinions 
have imposed upon punitive damages . . . [but] I continue to believe the prior 
holdings were in error.”). 
39. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. 
Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (upholding local government solid waste flow 
control policy against Dormant Commerce Clause challenge). Cf. C & A 
Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidating local 
government solid waste flow control policy under Dormant Commerce Clause). 
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Where the Roberts Court appears to most deserve the “pro-
business” label is in its apparent hostility to policy-driven litigation and 
entrepreneurial efforts by trial lawyers to expand corporate liability. As 
former Solicitor General Kenneth Starr observed, the Roberts Court’s 
handling of business cases suggests the Court “is not so much pro-
business as it is massively skeptical of civil litigation, especially 
nationwide civil litigation.”40 This may explain why the Roberts Court 
has been particularly stingy in recognizing implied causes of action,41 
expressed skepticism of expansive class-action theories,42 strictly en-
forced arbitration provisions,43 and tightened pleading requirements.44 
Business and the Roberts Court was not the last word on the 
Roberts Court’s approach to business issues. Instead, it sought to en-
courage a more thoughtful and nuanced discussion of how the Court 
approaches issues of importance to business. Accordingly, in September 
2016, the Center for Business Law & Regulation at the Case Western 
Reserve University School of Law hosted a symposium to further ex-
plore these issues and continue the conversation about business and the 
Roberts Court.45 Articles from the conference are included in this Issue. 
If the Roberts Court is, indeed, favorable to business, this did not 
occur overnight. The justices that make up the current court were 
selected by five separate presidents over a period of thirty years.46 As a 
consequence, the Supreme Court, at any given moment, is the product 
of long-term political forces and changes in the political landscape. For 
 
40. Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court & the Business Cases, 35 Pepp. L. 
Rev. 541, 541 (2008). 
41. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Sci.-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008) 
(holding that an implied cause of action for securities fraud does not exist 
because the underlying statute cannot be interpreted to show that Congress 
intended to create one). 
42. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (2011) (holding that 
common claims for monetary relief that is not incidental to injunctive or 
declaratory relief is not sufficient to certify a class). 
43. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (holding 
that a California rule classifying collective-arbitration waivers as uncon-
scionable and therefore unenforceable violated the Federal Arbitration Act). 
44. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Civil Procedure in the Roberts Court, in Business 
and the Roberts Court, supra note 10, at 143 (arguing that the Court’s 
recent decisions to impose heightened pleading requirements are not as 
revolutionary as some commentators predicted). 
45. To see an archived video of the conference, see The Ctr. for Bus. Law & 
Regulation, Business in the Roberts Court, Case W. Reserve Univ. (Sept. 
23, 2016), http://law.case.edu/Lectures-Events/EventId/5/e/business-in-the-
roberts-court-23-sep-2016 [https://perma.cc/HG54-552R]. 
46. At the time of this writing Justice Neil Gorsuch had not yet been confirmed 
to the Supreme Court. Upon his confirmation, the Court includes justices 
that were nominated by each of the past six Presidents. 
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this reason, Mitch Pickerill and Cornell Clayton argue that to 
understand the Court, we must understand “political regimes” and how 
the Court approaches economic questions over a longer period of time.47 
In their view, the Court has become more favorable to business inter-
ests, at least as measured by outcomes in cases involving economic 
regulation and union activity, largely as a result of conservative politics, 
which have also influenced the Court in other ways.48 
As Brianne Gorod of the Constitutional Accountability Center 
notes, the Chamber of Commerce has been “remarkably successful” as 
a party and amicus in the Supreme Court over the past ten years.49 
Using the Chamber as a “proxy” for business interests more generally, 
this represents good news for the business community. At the same 
time, Gorod fears, the Chamber’s success indicates that individuals 
have a more difficult time “holding businesses accountable in court 
when they violate the law.”50 
As this Introduction indicates, not all accept the claim that the 
Roberts Court is pro-business. James Copland of the Manhattan In-
stitute for Policy Research challenges the assumption that the Roberts 
Court is pro-business and, more provocatively, suggests that “there is 
nothing inherently wrong” with a pro-business Court, “at least to the 
extent that it is favoring not ‘crony capitalism’ or the fruits of big-
business lobbying that generate barriers to entry, but rather reaching 
decisions that are generally applicable and pro-free-market.”51 Copland 
further suggests that analysts place “undue emphasis” on the Supreme 
Court, given the extent to which the legal forces that constrain 
corporate activity, including much regulatory enforcement and share-
holder activism, often operate outside the bounds of judicial review.52 
For judicial review to operate, courts must have jurisdiction, and 
the bounds of personal jurisdiction in federal courts is in a bit of flux. 
As Cassandra Robertson and Rocky Rhodes observe, in four cases de-
cided within three years, the Roberts Court has “significantly changed 
 
47. See J. Mitchell Pickerill & Cornell W. Clayton, The Roberts Court and 
Economic Issues in an Era of Polarization, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 693 
(2017) (“We draw from . . . political science literature on the Court to 
provide a more robust understanding of how the Court gradually became 
more business friendly over time.”). 
48. Id. 
49. Brianne Gorod, The First Decade of the Roberts Court: Good for Business 
Interests, Bad for Legal Accountability, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 721 (2017). 
50. Id. 
51. James R. Copland, What Do We Mean by a “Pro-Business” Court—And 
Should We Care? 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 743 (2017). 
52. Id. 
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the shape of personal jurisdiction doctrine” establishing a “new equili-
brium” for the doctrine.53 While aspects of this change are favorable for 
business defendants, they find “little evidence” that these changes were 
“motivated by a desire to favor business interests.”54 Instead, Robertson 
and Rhodes suggest, these changes were “driven . . . by a commitment 
to formalist evaluation of individual cases and a generalized resistance 
to allowing United States courts to serve as a magnet forum for 
transnational litigation.”55 
Just as corporate defendants may favor limitations on personal 
jurisdiction, many large corporations favor broad federal preemption of 
state tort law. Thus, some business groups have supported agency 
edicts asserting federal rules preempt conflicting state laws. At the same 
time, business groups have become increasingly hostile to the doctrine 
of Auer deference, under which courts defer to agency interpretations 
of their own regulation. As Catherine Sharkey observes, these 
commitments are occasionally in conflict, as when a federal agency 
asserts that its regulations should be interpreted to have preemptive 
effect.56 Thus far, the Roberts Court appears to be more supportive of 
preemption claims than it is hostile to Auer deference, but that could 
change. Business groups are increasingly united in their opposition to 
Auer and several justices have raised questions about its desirability. 
No discussion of business law in the Supreme Court is complete 
without some consideration of securities law, an area in which the 
Roberts Court has been particularly active.57 While the Roberts Court 
has considered a comparatively large number of securities law cases, it 
has not shown much interest in the underlying subject matter, leading 
Eric Chaffee to suggest the Court has adopted the role of “museum 
curator” for securities law: “maintaining historical relics from bygone 
eras, doing minor restoration work as needed, limiting access to these 
relics through statutory interpretation, and occasionally offering an 
 
53. Cassandra Burke Robertson & Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Business 
of Personal Jurisdiction, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 775 (2017). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 777. 
56. See Catherine M. Sharkey, The Anti-Deference Pro-Preemption Paradox at 
the U.S. Supreme Court: The Business Community Weighs In, 67 Case W. 
Res. L. Rev. 805 (2017) (discussing the apparent paradox of business groups 
“advocating in favor of more preemption, including preemption by agency 
action, while simultaneously pushing for reconsideration of Auer deference”). 
57. See A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or 
Indifference?, in Business and the Roberts Court, supra note 10, at 94, 
95 (noting that the Roberts Court decided fifteen securities cases in its first 
seven years, whereas the Rehnquist Court decided just twenty during 1986–
2005). 
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exhibition involving issues at the periphery of securities law.”58 The 
result is that securities law has been “relatively stable” and Chief 
Justice Roberts seems to be the Chief Curator of this museum, having 
been in the majority of all twenty-one securities law cases decided since 
he has joined the Court.59 
Whatever one concludes about the Roberts Court’s approach to 
business issues, the Court is still a work in progress. At 62, John 
Roberts is likely to remain the Chief Justice for some time to come. In 
the interim, the Court’s composition will change, as will the conste-
llation of issues presented for its review. As a consequence, whatever 
conclusions we reach about the Roberts Court’s relationship to business 
is subject to revision, and this is a subject that will be worth revisiting. 
 
58. Eric Chaffee, The Supreme Court as Museum Curator: Securities Regulation 
and the Roberts Court, 67 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 847 (2017). 
59. Id. at 893. 
